Turkeuro
Roadmap · 06

Defensive security work

This is a future plan. Defensive security work is not available in the mailbox today. The work would be aimed at Turkeuro's own service and at attacks on Turkeuro accounts. It is not a service that attacks anyone.

What it is

Defensive security work, in this plan, has two parts, and both face inward. People and tools would have the job of stopping attacks on Turkeuro accounts. They would also take a good-faith report of a flaw in Turkeuro's own service, so the company can fix what it runs. The person who writes that report is someone who noticed a problem in Turkeuro and stopped. They are not hiring Turkeuro to break into a different company.

It is for the people who hold Turkeuro accounts, because the defensive work would be about those accounts, and for a person who wants a flaw in this service fixed. It is not for someone who wants an attack carried out, described, or practiced. Turkeuro does not offer that, and this plan would not add it.

A report would be read so Turkeuro can fix its own systems. The reading is the point. A report that asks Turkeuro to enter an account that is not part of this service, or to harm someone else's system, would be outside the plan. The plan has no second face that does that work under a different name.

How the logic would work

A good-faith report would name the Turkeuro page or the Turkeuro host, say what the person observed, and stop. The useful report is a description of a flaw in this service. Turkeuro would use it to correct its own mailbox, its own site, or its own account door. The person writing would not be asked to go further, and they would not be asked to demonstrate the flaw against anyone else's account.

Stopping attacks on Turkeuro accounts would mean defending the accounts Turkeuro operates. The work would look at abuse aimed at those accounts and at the service that holds them. It would not look outward as an attack on a network that is not Turkeuro's. A tool in this plan would be a tool for that defense. This page does not describe the tool, and it does not hand one out.

The company would keep the report long enough to fix the issue and to know what it fixed. It would not turn the report into a public set of instructions. Publishing a flaw so that other people can copy it is not the plan. Fixing the service is the plan.

Because the work is not in the mailbox today, there is no desk taking these reports as a product, and there is no defensive tool a customer can switch on. The security page is where Turkeuro says which account controls exist. This roadmap page is the plan for the defensive work, and the plan is not running.

What you would see

A person who had found a flaw would see a plain place to write what they saw, with room for the page, the host, and what happened, and with a clear stop. They would see that the report is about Turkeuro. They would not see a board of other people's systems, and they would not see a request to keep going.

An account holder would not see a feed of attacks, and they would not see a console. If Turkeuro later tells people what it changed in its own service, that telling would be a note about Turkeuro. It would not be a story about breaking into someone else.

Today there is no such form on this page. The account holder sees Login settings for their own mailbox, and they see the security page. They do not see a defensive-work product.

What it would not do

It would not attack anyone. It would not enter an account that is not a Turkeuro account the company operates. It would not write an intrusion, sell one, or walk a reader through one. A person who wants that will not find it here, and a future version of this plan would still not be that service.

It would not pay for a report. This page names no reward. It would not invite anyone to keep testing after they have written down the flaw. It would not ask for a password, an account code, or a verification code as part of the report. Those secrets do not belong in a letter about a flaw.

It would not replace the account holder's own care. A report about Turkeuro's service does not change the password on someone else's mailbox, and defensive work that is not built does not watch a person's other sessions. Suspicious-access blocking is a different idea, and it is not switched on.

What is available today instead

You protect the mailbox you have. You keep the password private. If you saved a two-factor choice, an authenticator, email as a verification choice, or the Turkeuro account code, those choices stay saved, and they are not asked again at sign-in. Login settings are where those controls live while you are signed in.

There is no report desk in the product today. A flaw in Turkeuro is not something this page can file for you. The company that operates the mailbox is named on the security page. This plan is not that page, and it is not open.

What you can use today is a mailbox on Postfix, Dovecot, and SnappyMail. You sign in with a password. The account can hold a 41-character Turkeuro account code that starts with turkeuro, a two-factor choice, an authenticator, and email as a verification choice. Those second-factor choices are saved with the account. They are not asked again at sign-in. The connection uses TLS. Login settings hold the sign-in controls for the mailbox you have open. There is a Windows desktop app. Business plans are listed at https://turkeuro.com/business.

SMS sends nothing. A mobile number saved on the account does not produce a text message from Turkeuro. The unlock choice in Login settings does not lock the screen. Those are limits of the mailbox as it is. They are not a quiet version of the plan on this page.