Turkeuro
Roadmap · 26

Responsible disclosure

This is a future plan. Responsible disclosure is not available in the mailbox today. There is no open desk for flaw reports, and this page names no reward. It explains how a person would write to the company about a flaw in Turkeuro's own service, and it stops there.

What it is

A person who finds a flaw in Turkeuro would have a published way to report it in good faith, and Turkeuro would read that report in order to fix its own service. The path would not ask anyone to break into someone else's account. The report is about this company, this site, and this mailbox.

It is for that person: someone who noticed a problem, stopped, and wants the company to know. It is not for someone looking for a contest, a payment, or permission to keep poking at other people's accounts. This page does not open a contest. It does not state an amount. A reward invented on a roadmap would be a false offer.

Until a desk is actually open, a person who needs to write to the company can write to the company that operates the mailbox. That company's address is 3422 Old Capitol Trail #700, Wilmington, DE 19808, USA. The address is the one already printed on the security page. This roadmap page is not a new inbox, and it is not a staffed program.

How the logic would work

The letter would be plain. It would name the Turkeuro page or the Turkeuro host. It would describe what the person observed, in enough detail that the company can find the flaw in its own service. It would say that the person stopped. It would include a way for the company to reply, if the person wants a reply. It would not include a request that Turkeuro enter anyone else's account, and it would not include a password, an account code, or a verification code.

The person would send that letter to the company, at the Wilmington address above, because that is a real destination and this page will not invent an email address and call it monitored. A published disclosure address, if Turkeuro later prints one on a page that is actually staffed, would replace the need to guess. Guessing security@ or a similar local part is how false inboxes start. Do not do that from this page.

Turkeuro would read a good-faith letter in order to fix its own service. This page does not promise a reply window. A promise of a reply by a certain time would be a schedule, and this roadmap does not publish schedules. Fixing the service is the aim. A public write-up of the flaw, for other people to copy, is not the aim.

Writing the letter is not an invitation to go further. A person who has enough to describe the flaw has enough to stop. The plan would not thank anyone for continuing. Defensive work against attacks on Turkeuro accounts is a separate plan, and it is also not a service that attacks anyone. The two plans face the same direction: Turkeuro's own service.

What you would see

A person would see this explanation of the letter, the company name, and the Wilmington address. They would see that the letter is about a flaw in Turkeuro. They would see that no reward is offered on this page.

They would not see a form that asks them to keep testing. They would not see a list of other companies to try the same thing against. They would not see a payment.

Today they see this article and the security page. They do not see an open disclosure desk, a ticket number, or a monitored disclosure inbox.

What it would not do

It would not invite an attack. It would not ask the reader to try the flaw against another person, another company, or an account they do not hold. It would not pay a reward. It would not publish a set of steps for breaking in. The letter describes a flaw so it can be fixed. The letter is not a lesson for someone else.

It would not collect the mailbox password. It would not pretend that an address you invented is monitored. It would not promise that every letter becomes a public advisory. It would not make Turkeuro the fixer of other people's systems.

It is not open as a desk today. The address above is the company's published address, not a claim that a disclosure team is sitting ready.

What is available today instead

Protect your own mailbox with the password, and with the second-factor choices you saved if you saved them. Those choices are not asked again at sign-in. Login settings hold them while you are signed in. TLS covers the connection.

There is no disclosure product in the mailbox. The security page is where the company name and the Wilmington address are stated for the service. This plan does not add a second company and does not add a bounty.

What you can use today is a mailbox on Postfix, Dovecot, and SnappyMail. You sign in with a password. The account can hold a 41-character Turkeuro account code that starts with turkeuro, a two-factor choice, an authenticator, and email as a verification choice. Those second-factor choices are saved with the account. They are not asked again at sign-in. The connection uses TLS. Login settings hold the sign-in controls for the mailbox you have open. There is a Windows desktop app. Business plans are listed at https://turkeuro.com/business.

SMS sends nothing. A mobile number saved on the account does not produce a text message from Turkeuro. The unlock choice in Login settings does not lock the screen. Those are limits of the mailbox as it is. They are not a quiet version of the plan on this page.